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INTRODUCTION

Adolofo Davis’s childhood was marked by poverty and an
absent family.1 He became heavily involved in gang activity when
he was only fourteen years old.2 In response to a gang related
dispute, Adolofo and two others went to the home of rival gang
members and shot at those inside.3 The shooting left two dead.4
Adolofo’s level of participation in the shooting was questioned at
trial.5 Evidence was presented that he did not shoot a weapon at
all,6 but he was still found guilty and sentenced to life without
parole — the only sentence available.7
Growing up, Kuntrell Jackson was surrounded by violence.8
Kuntrell was involved in a botched robbery when he was fourteen
years old.9 He and two others attempted to rob a video store.10
Kuntrell stayed outside but eventually entered the store.11 After he
entered the store, the store’s clerk was shot and killed by one of the
individuals Kuntrell was with.12 At trial, Kuntrell was found guilty
and sentenced to life without parole — the only sentence available.13

* JD, UIC John Marshall Law School 2020. Thanks to Professor Hugh
Mundy, Michael Podgurski, Marlee Turim-Walloch, Margaret Shadid, Michael
Drake, Mark Gibbs, and the UIC JMLS Law Review Board, specifically
Kandace Hofer, for their respective edits and inspiration for this Comment.
1. Erik Eckholm, A Murderer at 14, Then a Lifer, Now a Man Pondering a
Future, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2015), www.nytimes.com/2015/04/12/us/justicesruling-allows-illinois-man-jailed-at-14-to-reconsider-his-future.html
(discussing that from age six or seven Adolfo had the choice of going hungry or
finding a way to feed himself, and at age twelve joined the Gangster Disciples).
2. People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 709, 714 (Ill. 2014).
3. People v. Davis, 904 N.E.2d 149, 152 (2009).
4. Id. The bullets recovered from the two bodies were from a .38 caliber and
.32 caliber gun, and .22 caliber bullets were found only in a window of the
apartment. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 152-53. One eyewitness testified he knocked the gun out of Adolofo’s
hand after he entered the apartment while another eyewitness testified he saw
all three individuals, including Adolfo, fire their guns. Id. at 152.
7. Davis, 6 N.E.3d at 714 (discussing the rationale behind the sentencing –
as Adolofo was convicted of murdering more than one victim, Illinois required
him to be sentenced to life without parole).
8. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 478 (2012) (adding that both his mother
and grandmother were perpetrators of shootings).
9. Id. at 465.
10. Id. Only on the way to the video store did Kuntrell learn that one of the
other individuals had a gun. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 465-66. At trial there was a dispute as to whether, when Kuntrell
went into the store, he said “we ain’t playin’” or said to his friends “I thought
you all was playin.’” Id. at 465.
13. Id. at 466. (discussing that the only punishment available for Kuntrell’s
crimes was life without parole since Kuntrell was tried as an adult and found
guilty of capital felony murder and aggravated robbery).
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Andrew Anderson was raised in a neighborhood riddled with
gang activity.14 At a young age he became involved with the gang in
his neighborhood, whose members taught him how to sell crack
cocaine.15 When Andrew was just seventeen years old, he saw
another gang member reach for a gun.16 Andrew, fearing for his life,
shot first.17 He was found guilty of first degree murder and
sentenced to sixty years in prison.18
After Adolofo, Kuntrell, and Andrew were sentenced, the
Supreme Court ruled, in Miller v. Alabama, that juveniles cannot
be mandatorily sentenced to life without parole.19 This holding left
around 2,000 juveniles across the United States serving
unconstitutional sentences that needed to be addressed.20 Adolofo
and Kuntrell eventually received resentencing hearings, and were
resentenced in accordance with the holding in Miller v. Alabama.21
While the crimes and the levels of participation that these two
juveniles engaged in were similar, the new sentencing outcomes
from these hearings were not. Adolofo was resentenced in an Illinois
Circuit Court to life in prison, although his sentence was later
reduced to a term of years.22 Kuntrell was resentenced in an
Arkansas lower court to twenty years in prison and was released in
February 2017.23Although Andrew was not sentenced to life
without parole, his sixty-year sentence makes it probable that he

14. Emily Hoerner & Jeanne Kuang, Less Than Life, INJUSTICE WATCH
(May 6, 2018), www.injusticewatch.org/features/illinois-juvenile-offenders-lifewithout-parole/ [hereinafter Hoerner & Kuang, Less Than Life]
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Miller, 567 U.S. at 479.
20. Josh Rovner, Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Overview, SENT’G
PROJECT (Feb. 25, 2020), www. sentencingproject.org/publications/juvenile-lifewithout-parole/.
21. Davis, 6 N.E.3d at 714; Miller, 567 U.S. at 489.
22. Annie Sweeny & Jason Meisner, Resentencing Forced by U.S. High Court
Ends in Life in Prison Again, CHI. TRIB. (May 4, 2015),
www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-mandatory-life-juvenileresentencing-met-20150504-story. html. Yet, two years after his resentencing
hearing, when a different state’s attorney headed the prosecutorial office,
prosecutors agreed to reduce Adolofo’s sentence. Patrick Smith, In Major
Reversal, Cook County Prosecutors Agree to Reduce Sentence of Addolfo Davis,
WBEZ CHI. (Sept. 25, 2017), www.wbez.org/shows/wbez-news/in-majorreversal-cook-county-prosecutors-agree-to-reduce-sentence-of-addolfodavis/9febd9f5-36fd-4611-8af2-3296990c49dc; Addolfo Davis, ILL. DEP’T
CORRECTIONS
INMATE
SEARCH,
www2.illinois.gov/idoc/Offender/pages/inmatesearch.aspx
(select
IDOC
Number, search “B55374”) (last visited March 30, 2020).
23. Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 31,
2017), www.ap.org/explore/locked-up-for-life/Miller-v-Alabama-and-Jackson-vHobbs.
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will die in prison.24 While his sentence has the practical effect of life
without parole, the Illinois court he was tried in has not yet
addressed his sentence under Miller.25 He remains in prison,
eligible to be released when he is seventy-eight.26
States have been given wide latitude in implementing the
rulings in Miller and its companion case, Montgomery v.
Louisiana—which made the Miller ruling retroactive.27 This
includes how individuals are eligible to be resentenced and what
must be considered in a resentencing hearing. This wide latitude
helps explain the disparate outcomes for the three juveniles
discussed above. Each state has its own statutes, case law, and
pending legislation regarding what should be done with juveniles
whose sentences now violate Miller.28 Some states have allowed for
these juveniles to be given parole immediately29 or given parole
after a term of years has been served.30 Some states have passed no
legislation on the topic specifically and rely solely on case law.31
Other states have limited the number of juveniles serving life
without parole sentences and therefore have no need to address
these issues.32 In every state, the outcomes for these juveniles have
24. Hoerner & Kuang, Less Than Life, supra note 14; Andrew Anderson, ILL.
DEP’T
CORRECTIONS
INMATE
SEARCH,
www2.illinois.gov/idoc/Offender/pages/inmatesearch.aspx
(select
IDOC
Number, search “M35076”) (last visited March 30, 2020).
25. Hoerner & Kuang, Less Than Life, supra note 14. Andrew has submitted
a resentencing request but it has not been heard by the court yet. Id.
26. Id.
27. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 732 (2016) (giving retroactivity
to Miller v. Alabama).
28. Compare 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122 (2018) (allowing juveniles to file
post-conviction petitions), with FLA. STAT. § 921.1402 (2018) (allowing juveniles
sentenced to have their sentences reviewed after serving a number of years).
29. This approach has been criticized by victims’ rights’ groups, who state
multiple parole hearings force families of victims to relive the pain of losing
their loved one. Emily Hoerner & Jeanne Kuang, 167 Illinois Prisoners Serving
Life Sentences for Crimes Committed as Juveniles, CHI. SUN-TIMES (May 6,
2018),
chicago.suntimes.com/crime/injustice-watch-department-corrections167-illinois-prisoners-serving-life-sentences-for-crimes-committed-asjuveniles/.
30. A State-By-State Look at Juvenile Life Without Parole, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (July 31, 2017), apnews.com/9debc3bdc7034ad2a68e62911fba0d85
[hereinafter State-By-State Look]. Arkansas law mandates that juveniles
serving life without parole are now eligible for parole after twenty-five years
(for first degree murder) or thirty years (for capital murder). Id. Connecticut
law mandates that minors who received more than fifty years be eligible for
parole after thirty years, and minors who received ten to fifty years be eligible
for parole after twelve years or after sixty percent of their sentence is served.
Id.
31. Id. In Arizona, life without parole for juveniles was never mandatory for
any crime; now cases where juveniles received these sentences are being
reviewed, without any legislation passed to mandate this. Id.
32. Id. (describing that Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, New Mexico, Rhode Island,
Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming currently have no juveniles serving life
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varied, from new sentences to the same sentence to parole
eligibility.
This Comment analyzes how states’ differing procedural and
substantive laws regarding resentencing hearings after Miller have
impacted individuals serving juvenile life without parole. These
laws are analyzed to determine how they impact who is eligible to
be resentenced, the length of new sentences received, and the states’
pace in resentencing. This Comment focuses only on states that
have implemented Miller through resentencing hearings, not those
states that give parole or parole eligibility to juveniles serving
unconstitutional sentences. Part II of this Comment explains the
origins and developments of Eighth Amendment juvenile
jurisprudence and the genesis of cases relating to juvenile
sentencing and adolescent development. These cases culminated in
the holding in Miller, which concludes that states cannot
mandatorily sentence juveniles to life without parole.33 Part III
explores both the substantive and procedural laws that states have
adopted to comport with Miller and the state court cases which
impact the implementation of juvenile resentencing. Part III
focuses specifically on three states: Illinois, Florida, and Michigan.
Part IV proposes four different laws and regulations states should
adopt in order to address resentencing issues states like Illinois,
Florida, and Michigan are experiencing. These laws are proposed so
states can justly and expediently address these sentences and be in
accord with the Eighth Amendment, avoiding lengthy litigation and
confusion for the juveniles serving these sentences.

II. BACKGROUND
A. Evolution of the Eighth Amendment
Courts use the Eighth Amendment to interpret the
constitutionality of punishments that the government has imposed
on individuals convicted of crimes and the constitutionality of
legislation that imposes punishment on individuals.34 This
Amendment has been used to determine the constitutionality of
corporal punishment in schools35 and to determine the
constitutionality of fines.36 Yet the vast majority of Eighth
without parole sentences).
33. Miller, 567 U.S. at 465.
34. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 387 (1909) (stating that the
Eighth Amendment “limits the legislative discretion in determining to what
degree of severity an appropriate and usual mode of punishment may, in a
particular case, be inflicted”).
35. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977) (finding the Eighth
Amendment applies to criminal proceedings, not to discipline in public schools).
36. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 111 (1909) (holding a fine is
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Amendment cases pertain to the cruel and unusual punishment
clause, which addresses specifically the type of punishments the
government is constitutionally allowed to impose.37
During the adoption of the Bill of Rights, politicians debated
the merits of each proposed constitutional amendment.38 While
debating the Eighth Amendment, one politician opined that this
amendment must be adopted to guarantee that punishments will
not be inflicted just because they are cruel.39 Other politicians
challenged the potential amendment on different grounds,
suggesting the proposed words of the amendment were “too
indefinite.”40 Yet the Eighth Amendment passed and has been the
United States’ standard for determining the constitutionality of
punishments since 1791.41
The Eighth Amendment originates from the English Bill of
Rights.42 In fact, the language of the Eighth Amendment came
directly from Article Ten of the English Bill of Rights, which states
that “excessive Baile [sic] ought not to be required nor excessive
Fines imposed nor cruell [sic] and unusuall [sic] Punishments
inflicted.”43 The Supreme Court has interpreted the adoption of the
English Bill of Rights language to include the adoption of
traditionally English principles surrounding punishment, including
the common law tradition of proportionality in punishment.44 The
not a violation of the Eighth Amendment unless it is so “grossly excessive as to
amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law”); United States
v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998) (holding that “a punitive forfeiture
violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity
of a defendant’s offense”).
37. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted” Id.
(emphasis added).
38. Kenneth R. Bowling, “A Tub to the Whale”: The Founding Fathers and
Adoption of the Federal Bill of Rights, 8 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 223, 224 (1988).
39. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 754 (1789) (stating “it is sometimes necessary to
hang a man, villains often deserve whipping, and perhaps having their ears cut
off; but are we in the future to be prevented from inflicting these punishments
because they are cruel? If a more lenient mode of correcting vice and deterring
others from the commission of it would be invented, it would be very prudent in
the Legislature to adopt it; but until we have some security that this will be
done, we ought not to be restrained from making necessary laws by any
declaration of this kind.”).
40. Id.
41. Bowling, supra note 38, at 250.
42. John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899, 912 (2011) (stating that The
English Bill of Rights Cruel and Unusual Punishments clause was based on
common law tradition).
43. Celia Rumann, Tortured History: Finding Our Way Back to the Lost
Origins of the Eighth Amendment, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 661, 670 (2004). The only
difference between the English Bill of Rights and the Eighth Amendment is that
the Eighth Amendment has the word “shall” instead of “ought”. Id.
44. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285-86 (1983).
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Supreme Court has held in most cases involving cruel and unusual
punishment,45 the Eighth Amendment must be applied so that the
punishment is proportional to the offense.46
Over time, the Supreme Court developed a test to analyze laws
and statutes under the Eighth Amendment. In Trop v. Dulles, the
Supreme Court held the meaning of cruel and unusual punishment
must change over time and “must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.”47 The Supreme Court has looked at the consensus of state
laws to determine the evolving standards of decency48 and also
looked to international consensus on punishment.49 Yet the Court
has held that each case must be ultimately determined by a court’s
independent judgment to decide if a punishment violates the Eighth
Amendment and goes beyond our nation’s standards of decency.50
Courts repeatedly apply this test in order to uphold the core value
of the Eighth Amendment—the dignity of man.51

B. Abolishing the Juvenile Death Penalty: Roper v.
Simmons
One of the first applications of the evolving standards of
decency test in relation to juvenile sentencing was in Roper v.
Simmons.52 In this 2005 case, the Supreme Court held that
sentencing a juvenile to death is a violation of the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.53 The
Court discussed that the evolving standards of decency, evidenced

45. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991) (stating that the
“Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee”).
46. See Weems, 217 U.S. at 367 (finding that a punishment proportional to
the offense is a “precept of justice”); Atkins v. U.S., 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002)
(quoting Weems, 217 U.S. at 367); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010)
(citing Weems, 217 U.S. at 367).
47. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (stating that this must be the
test in order to ensure that the state’s power to punish “be exercised within the
limites [sic] of civilized standards”).
48. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564-68 (2005) (finding the majority of
states did not allow the death penalty for juveniles who committed their crimes
when they were under eighteen and using this rationale to determine this type
of punishment for this group was unconstitutional).
49. Id. at 577-78 (finding the United Kingdom’s ban on the juvenile death
penalty particularly instructive, as the United States Constitution’s Eighth
Amendment was modeled on the English Bill of Rights, but also stating that the
world’s consensus is only persuasive, not controlling).
50. Graham, 560 U.S. at 61.
51. Trop, 356 U.S. at 100 (discussing that the court may have few
opportunities to find punishment cruel and unusual but should not waiver in
its decision when it does).
52. Roper, 543 U.S. at 551.
53. Id. at 578.
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by state law54 and international law,55 led them to this decision. The
court also stressed that the differences in maturity and
development between adults and juveniles led them to their
conclusion.56
Roper sets out three main reasons why juveniles should be
treated differently under the law.57 These three reasons are
supported both by amici curiae briefs and scientific and
psychological studies.58 First, the Court discussed juveniles’ “lack of
maturity” and “underdeveloped sense of responsibility[.]”59 Second,
juveniles are much more impressionable and more swayed by peer
pressure and outside forces than adults.60 Third, the Court
discusses that the identity and character of juveniles are
underdeveloped.61
The Court used these three reasons to show that the conduct
of juveniles cannot be held to the same standard of culpability as
that of an adult.62 These reasons show that juveniles have a higher
chance at reform than adults and therefore cannot be sentenced to
death.63 No theory of punishment justifies the death penalty for a
group with a high potential for rehabilitation.64

54. Id. at 564-68 (discussing that thirty states prohibit the death penalty for
juveniles, which includes twelve states that have abolished the death penalty
entirely and eighteen other states that have made an exception for juveniles in
regards to the death penalty, and additionally emphasizing that even in states
that allowed the death penalty for juveniles, it was given as a punishment very
infrequently).
55. Id. at 576-78 (discussing Article 37 of the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of Child, which prohibits the death penalty for those under eighteen,
and that every single country in the world had ratified, except for the United
States and Somalia, and that only seven countries in the world have put any
juveniles to death since 1990).
56. Id. at 569-72.
57. Id. at 569-70.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 569 (discussing that these two qualities result in reckless behavior
and are the reasons why many states do not allow minors to engage in various
activities such as voting, marriage, or being on a jury).
60. Id. (citing studies which state minors have less freedom and control over
their lives and over their own environments than adults do).
61. Id. at 570 (citing E. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS (1968) to
show the personality traits of juveniles are more likely to change and shift as
they become adults).
62. Id.
63. Id. (discussing that because of these traits, juveniles are more likely to
reform and there is less evidence that a juvenile is a morally irreprehensible
individual that cannot be reformed and deserves punishment).
64. Id. at 571 (discussing that the penological justifications, including
retribution and deterrence, for punishment are not applicable as these juveniles
do not understand their actions as well as adults and have a high probability of
reform).
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C. No Life Sentences for Juveniles’ Non-Homicide
Crimes: Graham v. Florida
Five years after Roper, the case of Terrance Graham came
before the Supreme Court.65 Terrance had been found guilty of a
non-homicide crime, armed burglary, and attempted robbery, and
sentenced to life without parole.66 The Court determined that life
without parole sentences for juveniles who have committed nonhomicide crimes violate the Eighth Amendment.67 The Court
discussed four main reasons for this holding.68 First, the Court
referenced Roper and stated that all of the juvenile psychological
development research put forth in that case remains true,69 and
since juveniles committing non-homicide crimes do not intend to
kill, their culpability is “twice diminished.”70 Second, the Court
looked at the national consensus surrounding juvenile resentencing
laws and determined that states are against this type of
punishment, based both on state law and the actual punishments
that states were meting out at that time.71 Third, in analyzing the
proportionality of the punishment itself, the Court discussed that
life without parole is much more serious for juveniles than for
adults because a juvenile with this sentence will be spending more
of their life incarcerated than any adult would.72 Finally, the Court
discussed at length that no theory of punishment—retribution,
deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation—can support a
sentence of life without parole for a juvenile, as none of these
65. Graham, 560 U.S. at 53 (discussing that Terrence’s parents were
addicted to crack cocaine during his childhood, he suffered from ADHD, and he
began using drugs at age thirteen).
66. Id. at 57 (describing that Terrence’s sentence was the maximum
available for these crimes, and since Florida had abolished parole, his life
sentence gave him no possibility for release at all).
67. Id. at 82.
68. Id. at 74.
69. Id. at 68 (discussing that Roper found juveniles have lessened
culpability, lack of maturity, more vulnerable to negative influences, and
therefore “cannot be classified among the worst offenders” and additionally,
minor’s brain development continues far through their teen years).
70. Id. at 69 (discussing that non-homicide crimes are morally different than
homicide crimes and those that do not intend to kill do not deserve as serious of
a punishment).
71. Id. at 62-63 (finding that six states do not allow life without parole for
juveniles for any offense, seven do, but only for homicides, and thirty-seven
allow life without parole for juveniles, but only in certain circumstances. Yet
the court also looked to actual implementation and found that only 109 juveniles
across the United States were serving life without parole sentences for a nonhomicide crime).
72. Id. at 70 (giving an example that a sixteen-year-old and a seventy-fiveyear-old who were both sentenced to life without parole would not in practice be
receiving the same type of sentence at all, even though on paper the sentence is
the same).
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theories would be served by this type of punishment.73
Graham builds on the findings in Roper, giving further
credence to the idea that juveniles are different from adults,74 a
recognition the Court has emphasized in other cases as well.75 The
case found that beyond the death penalty, there are other
punishments that are disproportionate when applied to juveniles.
Beyond the substantive impact on juvenile sentencing, Graham
discussed how this ruling should and can be applied in state courts.
The Court held that juveniles with these sentences must have some
“meaningful opportunity for release.”76 This implies that state
courts have a wide range of options when resentencing these
juveniles. The Court even indicated that “[i]t is for the State . . . to
explore the means and mechanisms for compliance.”77 The Court
gives no other direction on the types of new sentences states can
give, or how to implement this new prohibition on life without
parole for juveniles convicted of non-homicide offenses.

D. Juveniles Mandatorily Sentenced to Life Without
Parole: Miller v. Alabama
Just two years after Graham, a similar case was presented to
the Supreme Court, in Miller v. Alabama. This case centered on two
juveniles convicted of murder and mandatorily sentenced to life
without parole.78 The Court found that a mandatory sentence of life
without parole for a juvenile in any type of case is
unconstitutional.79 The court deferred substantially to Roper and
Graham in order to emphasize the differences between adults and
juveniles,80 including the “diminished culpability [of children] and

73. Id. at 71-75.
74. Contra Craig S. Lerner, Juvenile Criminal Responsibility: Can Malice
Supply the Want of Years? 86 TUL. L. REV. 309, 311 (2011) (arguing the
categorical assumptions in Graham and similar cases regarding the maturity
and culpability of juveniles are false).
75. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (2011) (holding that “a child’s age
properly informs the Miranda custody analysis); McKeiver v. Pa., 403 U.S. 528,
550 (1971) (holding that juveniles have no constitutional right to a jury trial in
juvenile court, in part because a jury trial would ignore “every aspect of fairness,
of concern, of sympathy, and of paternal attention that the juvenile court system
contemplates”).
76. Graham, 560 U.S. at 75 (stating that these juveniles do not have to be
promised eventual freedom, just a meaningful opportunity for release, based on
how they have matured and grown in their time in prison since their crime).
77. Id.
78. Miller, 567 U.S. at 465 (discussing that the two individuals, Evan Miller
and Kuntrell Jackson, both were involved in killings that stemmed from
botched robberies).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 470-73.
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[their] greater prospects for reform[.]”81 The Court also referred to
these previous cases to highlight that mandatory life without parole
for juveniles is not rational under any theory of punishment.82 The
Court concluded that, in sentencing juveniles, a trier of fact must
be able to consider both the characteristics of the juvenile and the
type of offense they committed in order for the sentence to be
proportional and constitutional.83 Therefore, any mandatory
sentence of life without parole for juveniles is unconstitutional, as
that type of sentence does not allow courts to take into account the
individual characteristics of a juvenile or the circumstances of the
specific crime in question.84
While Miller held that this specific mandatory sentencing
scheme for juveniles was unconstitutional, the practical
implementation of this ruling varies. The case does not completely
prohibit life without parole sentences for juveniles – if a court has
the ability to take into account the circumstances of these juveniles
in their sentencings, they could be sentenced to life without parole
again.85 This case only mandates that this category of offenders
have the characteristics of their youth and background analyzed to
determine a proportionate sentence.86 Logistically, this could be
accomplished through many different avenues, and Miller did not
give states any hint of how to implement this ruling.87 This left
states to figure out how this ruling should be applied in each state
court, including its application to juveniles already sentenced under
this scheme.

E. Retroactivity of Miller: Montgomery v. Louisiana
After Miller, states came to different conclusions on the
retroactivity of the ruling in Miller. Some states applied the ruling
to juveniles sentenced to life without parole before 2012,88 and some
states only applied the ruling going forward.89 The question of
81. Id. at 471.
82. Id. at 472-73 (discussing these theories of retribution, deterrence, and
rehabilitation).
83. Id. at 489.
84. Id. at 465.
85. Id. at 480. “Although we do not foreclose a sentencer’s ability to make
that judgment in homicide cases, we require it to take into account how children
are different . . . .” Id.
86. Id. at 489.
87. Id. at 480. Only stating that “appropriate occasion for sentencing
juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon.” Id. at 479.
88. Diatchenk v. District Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E. 3d 270, 276
(Mass. 2013) (including Massachusetts); Aiken v. Byars, 765 S.E.2d 572 (S.C.
2014) (including South Carolina); Davis, 6 N.E. at 722 (including Illinois); State
v. Mares, 335 P.3d 487, 508 (Wy. 2014) (including Wyoming).
89. Martin v. Symmes, 782 F.3d 939 (8th Cir. 2015) (including Minnesota);
Johnson v. Ponton, 780 F.3d 219, 226 (Va. 2015) (including Virginia); State v.
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retroactivity was brought up over and over again in state courts
until a case on this issue was brought to the Supreme Court in 2016,
Montgomery v. Louisiana.90 The case set out that “substantive rules
of constitutional law” and “watershed rules of criminal procedure”
must be given retroactive effect.91 The Court then ruled that Miller
did set out such a substantive rule and was, therefore, to be applied
retroactively,92 as the case made a certain punishment
unconstitutional for a certain class of offenders.93
The overarching ruling of the case, that Miller must be
interpreted to apply retroactively, meant mandatory life without
parole sentences given to juveniles before 2012 were now
unconstitutional.94 This meant that now states must address these
sentences in some way. The Court discussed that even when new
constitutional substantive rules are announced, the Court does not
want to burden the states with a court ordered procedural
implementation,95 especially regarding sentencing laws.96
The Court gave few options for implementation by states,
including giving these individuals new sentences,97 but the Court
also stated this may not be necessary in all cases.98 The Court went
on to suggest that in fact, deeming these individuals eligible for
parole would be enough to comport with the Court’s ruling.99 This
section of the opinion gave states wide latitude in implementing the
holding in Miller and Montgomery. While states do have to
implement this retroactively, how they go about this is up to the
individual state, and states have addressed this issue with widely
different rules and holdings. With such a wide range of possible
ways to address the issue, individuals waiting to be resentenced in
each state have had disparate outcomes, and some state courts have
already had to change the rulings they have made in order to

Tate, 130 So. 3d 829, 831 (La. 2013) (including Louisiana).
90. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 725.
91. Id. at 728 (discussing that Teague v. Lane set out the test to determine
whether a new analytical framework is retroactive) (quoting Schriro v.
Summerlin, 543 U.S. 348, 352 (2004)).
92. Id. at 732.
93. Id. at 734.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 735 (stating this was done in order “to avoid intruding more than
necessary upon the States’ sovereign administration of their criminal justice
systems”).
96. Id. (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416-17 (1986) (“we leave to
the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the
constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences”)).
97. Id. at 736.
98. Id.
99. Id. (stating that this “ensures that juveniles whose crimes reflected only
transient immaturity – and who have since matured – will not be forced to serve
a disproportionate sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment”).
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adequately address the issue of resentencing.100

III. ANALYSIS
The laws and decisions states have made in order to implement
Miller have a direct impact on each individual juvenile’s
resentencing hearing and the eventual new sentence itself.
Analyzing the laws and decisions of different states shows the
different paths states can take and how these laws and decisions
have worked in practice regarding resentencing. This section
contains a comparative analysis of procedural and substantive laws
and decisions in Illinois, Michigan, and Florida concerning juvenile
resentencing after Miller and Montgomery. This section also
discusses the sentencing outcomes for juveniles that were serving
mandatory life without parole in each of the three states when
Miller and Montgomery were decided. This Comment will focus on
specific topics regarding resentencing in each state, first focusing
on how juveniles sentenced to life without parole are eligible to be
considered for resentencing under Miller. Next, this Comment will
focus on the mechanics of a resentencing hearing itself,
concentrating on two different questions courts must address
within these hearings. First, whether there must be a finding of
permanent incorrigibility if a juvenile is to be resentenced to life
without parole.101 Second, whether states take into account an
individual’s behavior in prison when considering their
resentencing. Next, this Comment will analyze how these states
define a de facto life sentence, as this impacts the term of years
juveniles can be resentenced to, and who is eligible to be
resentenced.102 Finally, this section will discuss the resentencing
outcomes of actual individuals in these states who have been
resentenced since Miller. Overall, this analysis seeks to show what
types of laws and decisions increase or decrease eligibility to be
resentenced, and what types of laws and decisions increase or
decrease the actual resentence that juveniles receive.

100. Dan Sullivan, Florida Supreme Court Reverses Course on ReSentencing for Juvenile Offenders, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Nov. 25, 2018),
www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/florida-supreme-court-reverses-courseon-re-sentencing-for-juvenile-offenders-20181126/.
101. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734 (discussing that since Montgomery
stated that Miller barred life without parole for “all but the rarest juvenile
offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility” – some states
mandate a finding of incorrigibility before a new sentence of life without parole
is given to a juvenile).
102. If a certain term of years sentence given to a juvenile is equivalent to a
life sentence without parole – then the individual’s sentence could be reviewed
as if it were a life without parole sentence. People v. Buffer, 137 N.E.3d 763,
771 (Ill. 2019).
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A. Illinois’ Implementation of Miller and
Montgomery
1. Resentencing Eligibility of Juveniles
The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act sets out the
parameters for individuals seeking a review of their conviction or
sentence.103 A post-conviction petition can be filed if an individual’s
conviction resulted from a denial of their constitutional rights.104
The type of relief individuals seek under this act is not an appeal
but a collateral proceeding.105 Post-conviction petitions to address
resentencing under Miller and Montgomery fall under this act.106
There are time constraints on the eligibility of individuals to file
these petitions; if the individual never filed an appeal, they have
three years from the date of their conviction to file a post-conviction
petition, unless the delay was not due to their own “culpable
negligence.”107 Additionally, the Act states that “only one petition
may be filed by a petitioner . . . without leave of the court.”108 A court
will grant leave if the petitioner can demonstrate there is a reason
for failing to bring a certain claim in a previous post-conviction
petition and prejudice resulted from failing to bring that claim.109
Many individuals in Illinois, who filed post-conviction petitions
before Miller, were able to file a successive post-conviction petition
alleging a Miller violation under this subsection of the law.110 Based
on Illinois law, individuals who would be eligible for resentencing
under Miller must file petitions for themselves and are not

103. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122.
104. Patrick J. Quinn & John J. Hynes, Impact of Recent Decisions Upon
Proceedings Under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 639,
640 (2003); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-1(a)(1) (stating the denial of rights may
be either under the U.S. Constitution or the Illinois Constitution).
105. Quinn & Hynes, supra note 104 (quoting People v. Montgomery, 763
N.E.2d 369, 372 (Ill. 2001)).
106. Davis, 6 N.E.3d at 716.
107. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-1(c) (2020).
108. Id. § 5/122-1(f) (2020).
109. People v. Pitsonbarger, 793 N.E.2d 609, 621 (Ill. 2002) (affirming that
the cause-and-prejudice test is the test to determine whether a claim raised in
a later petition can be considered by the court on the merits).
110. People v. Williams, 982 N.E.2d 181, 196 (Ill. App. 2012) (discussing that
this “cause-and-prejudice test” was satisfied in Miller as it was a new rule of
criminal procedure, therefore no legal foundation for this argument was laid
when previous petitions were filed, therefore satisfying the cause part of the
cause-and-prejudice test, and satisfying the prejudice part of the test as Miller
retroactively applies to his case); People v. Craighead, 39 N.E.3d 1037, 1041 (Ill.
App. 2015) (discussing that cause was established because Miller was not an
legal argument previously available, and prejudice is established because the
Miller ruling applies retroactively).
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automatically entitled to any type of resentencing.111 In early 2019,
the Illinois Legislature passed a bill—later signed by the
governor—which allows for certain juveniles to petition for parole
after a certain number of years, depending on their crime and the
term of years that they were sentenced.112 While this new law does
not directly relate to resentencing eligibility, it gives those who
could be resentenced another route for release from prison.113
2. Making a Finding of Incorrigibility
In Montgomery v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court laid out
language indicating that only rarely should juveniles be sentenced
to life without parole, and only those showing “permanent
incorrigibility” should receive such sentences.114 Based on this
language, state courts have discussed whether minors must be
found to be permanently incorrigible in order to receive a new
sentence of life without parole.115 The Supreme Court has not
offered strict guidelines in regard to this requirement.116 In fact,
there are only a
few sentences devoted to this issue in
Montgomery.117 The Illinois Supreme Court ruled in September
2017 that a juvenile can only be sentenced to life without parole if
the trial court that imposes the sentence determines that the
minor’s conduct “showed irretrievable depravity, permanent
incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond the possibility of
rehabilitation.”118 This means that future sentences for juveniles
and future re-sentences of those convicted of crimes as juveniles
must have this finding in order to hand down a sentence of life
without parole. Three juveniles have been resentenced to life
without parole after Miller in Illinois, one was sentenced after a
finding of incorrigibility had to be made,119 and two were sentenced

111. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-1.
112. Dan Petrella, Gov. J.B. Pritzker Signs Law Creating Parole Review for
Young Offenders with Lengthy Sentences, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 1, 2019),
www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-met-jb-pritzker-parole-reform20190401-story.html.
113. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-115 (2019).
114. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734.
115. People v. Holman, 91 N.E.3d 849, 863 (Ill. 2017).
116. Id. at 861 (stating that “[t]he Court remained hesitant to create more
procedural requirements for state trial courts, such as a requirement that
courts make findings of fact regarding a juvenile’s incorrigibility, before
imposing a life sentence”).
117. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734.
118. Holman, 91 N.E.3d at 863.
119. Kaitlyn Schwers, Convicted Murderer Re-Sentenced in Madison County
After
Reversal,
BELLEVILLE
NEWS-DISPATCH
(May
25,
2016),
www.bnd.com/news/local/article79732552.html (reporting that Terril Williams
was resentenced in May 2016 to life without parole).
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before this rule was put into place.120
3. Impact of Prison Behavior on Resentencing
The Illinois Supreme Court has held that when deciding if an
individual is eligible for resentencing under Miller, a court cannot
look at a prisoner’s behavior since the crime.121 A court can take
neither bad conduct in prison nor good conduct in prison into
account.122 In determining whether the individual is eligible for
resentencing, the court must only look at the facts present when the
individual was originally sentenced, not at any ensuing changes in
their personality or behavior.123 To support this finding, the Illinois
Supreme Court quoted Graham which stated that even if a finding
of incorrigibility was “corroborated” by bad conduct in prison – “the
sentence was still disproportionate because that judgment was
made at the outset.”124 This ruling could be interpreted to apply to
the evidence presented at the actual resentencing hearing, not just
at a hearing regarding eligibility for resentencing, but this has not
been the case in Illinois. Many resentencing hearings in Illinois
have discussed the juvenile’s life in prison in order to determine an
appropriate new sentence.125 In fact, the Illinois law that codifies
Miller and Montgomery, states that “the person’s potential for
rehabilitation or evidence of rehabilitation, or both” shall be
considered in determining an appropriate sentence.126 Evidence to
support this factor must almost necessarily include behavior in
prison, as this is where these juveniles have spent their entire adult
120. Francesca Gattuso, Man Convicted of 1995 Double Murder at Age
Seventeen Resentenced to Life, CHI. SUN-TIMES (Oct. 10, 2017),
chicago.suntimes.com/crime/man-convicted-of-1995-double-murder-at-age-17resentenced-to-life/ (reporting that Joseph Arietta was resentenced October
2017 to life without parole); Tony Reid, Decatur Man Re-Sentenced to Life in
Prison for 1994 Murders, DECATUR HERALD & REV. (Oct. 2, 2018), heraldreview.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/decatur-man-re-sentenced-to-life-inprison-for-murders/article_f58899e4-5a7c-5ac1-a8f5-0e1856857024.html
(reporting that Contrell Williams was resentenced October 2018 to life without
parole).
121. Holman, 91 N.E.3d at 864.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 73).
125. People v. Croft, 100 N.E.3d 577, 581 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018) (discussing
Croft’s high school records while imprisoned, and testimony from a Reverend
who spoke with Croft twice a week while he was awaiting trial); People v.
Williams, 2019 IL App (5th) 160367-U ¶ 34 (discussing the evidence presented
at resentencing, including his prison disciplinary violations, his demeanor
around prison guards, and his behavior in the juvenile detention center); People
v. Helgesen, 2018 IL App (2d) 160823-U ¶ 19 (discussing Helgesen’s minor
disciplinary actions while imprisoned, and the testimony at his resentencing
from prison guards regarding his behavior while incarcerated).
126. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-105(a)(4) (2016).
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lives.
4. Definition of a De Facto Life Sentence
In Illinois, if an individual is not incorrigible, then they must
be resentenced to a term of years.127 How a state defines life
sentences has two different impacts on juveniles serving time. First,
it can impact what a new sentence of an individual serving life
without parole can be, as they cannot be re-sentenced to life without
parole in some states if they are not found to be permanently
incorrigible. Second, it can also impact who is eligible to be
resentenced under Miller. If a term of years sentence is equivalent
to a sentence of life without parole – then a juvenile may be able to
be resentenced under Miller.128 Before 2019, the Illinois Supreme
Court had heard one main case that dealt with the definition of de
facto life.129 In People v. Reyes, a minor was sentenced to ninetyseven years and would only be eligible for parole after serving
eighty-nine of those years.130 While this was not life without parole
on paper, the court found that this sentence had the “same practical
effect” as a life without parole sentence.131 This meant that a
juvenile could not be sentenced to an “unsurvivable” prison term
without complying with Miller.132 Yet the Illinois Supreme Court
gave no specific definition of unsurvivable other than the example
in the case of eighty-nine years.133 Between 2016 and 2019, the
lower courts in Illinois had to individually determine what other
sentence lengths are equivalent to a de facto life sentence.134 In
April 2019, the Illinois Supreme Court heard an appeal of an
individual who was sentenced to fifty years as a juvenile and who
argued this was a de facto life sentence.135 The Court determined
that a forty-year sentence for a juvenile is the equivalent of a de
facto life sentence without parole, and the protections of Miller must
apply to any sentence that is forty years or higher.136 This ruling
will impact many individuals convicted as juveniles in Illinois,
127. Holman, 91 N.E.3d at 863.
128. Buffer, 137 N.E.3d at 771.
129. Dana Vollmer, Is 50 Years a Life Sentence for a Teenager?, NPR ILL.
(Jan. 15, 2019), www.nprillinois.org/post/50-years-life-sentence-teenager.
130. People v. Reyes, 63 N.E.3d 884, 886 (Ill. 2016).
131. Id. at 888.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. People v. Buffer, 75 N.E.3d 470, 471, 483 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017) (finding
that a fifty-year sentence given when defendant was sixteen years old was a de
facto life sentence); People v. Morris, 78 N.E.3d 429, 436 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017)
(finding that a 100-year sentence for a sixteen-year-old was a de facto life
sentence).
135. Buffer, 137 N.E.3d at 767.
136. Id. at 774 (determining this number from an analysis of the
legislature’s intent and current statutes).
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especially since the mandatory minimum for murder with a firearm
was forty-five years until 2016.137
5. Outcomes for Juvenile Resentencing in Illinois
There were an estimated 103 juveniles serving life without
parole when the decision in Miller was announced.138 Before
Montgomery, the Illinois Supreme Court found that Miller
retroactively applied to juveniles serving sentences of life without
parole.139 Since then, at least thirty-five of these 103 juveniles have
been resentenced.140 At least four have been sentenced to life
without parole again,141 at least three have been resentenced to fifty
years or less,142 at least nine have been resentenced between fiftyone and seventy-four years,143 and at least two have been

137. Emily Hoerner, Illinois Supreme Court Rules That 41-Year Term for
Juvenile Offender Amounts to Life, INJUSTICE WATCH (Apr. 18, 2019),
www.injusticewatch.org/news/2019/illinois-supreme-court-rules-that-41-yearterm-for-juvenile-offender-amounts-to-life/.
138. ILL. COALITION FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF CHILDREN,
CATEGORICALLY LESS CULPABLE: CHILDREN SENTENCED TO LIFE WITHOUT THE
POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE IN ILLINOIS 19 (2008).
139. Davis, 6 N.E.3d at 722.
140. State-By-State Look, supra note 30.
141. Schwers, supra note 119; Gattuso, supra note 120; Reid, supra note 120;
Isaac Smith, Union County Man Convicted in 1992 Slaying of His Parents
Sentenced to Life in Prison Again, SOUTHERN ILLINOISIAN (Nov. 23, 2019),
thesouthern.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/union-county-man-convicted-inslaying-of-his-parents-sentenced/article_e44a11d9-c746-5dbf-90904aa7a6dea638.html.
142. Duaa Eldeib & Steve Mills, New Hope of Freedom for Those Given
Mandatory Life Sentences as Juveniles, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 22, 2017),
www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-juveniles-life-in-prison-new-hope-met20170221-story.html (reporting that Lindsey Crittle was resentenced to fifty
years); Staff Report, Former Gang Member Gets 50 Years in Prison for Aurora
Murder, AURORA BEACON-NEWS (Feb. 8, 2017), www.chicagotribune.com/
suburbs/aurora-beacon-news/news/ct-abn-luciano-sentence-st-0210-20170208story.html (reporting that Michael Luciano was resentenced to fifty years);
Edith Brady-Lunny, Life Sentence Reduced for Sex Offender, PANTAGRAPH (Apr.
27, 2017), www.pantagraph.com/n ews/local/crime-and-courts/life-sentencereduced-for-sex-offender/article_8fd27c6d-96dd-5dc5-8303-abf56540ed05.html
(reporting that Brett Wilson was resentenced to forty-five years).
143. Megan Crepeau, Killer Resentenced Because of High Court Ruling
Given
60
Years
in
Prison,
CHI.
TRIB.
(May
23,
2017),
www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-juvenile-killer-resentenceddecades-later-met-20170523-story.html (reporting that Eric Anderson was
resentenced to sixty years and Wayne Antusas resentenced to fifty-five years);
Erin Chan Ding, Prison Sentences Reduced for Men Who Killed Two in Chicago
as
Teenagers,
CHI.
TRIB.
(June
6,
2016),
www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-double-murder-new-sentencechicago-met-20160606-story-html (reporting that Javell Ivory was resentenced
to fifty-four years, and Darnell Foxx to seventy-three years); Annie Sweeny,
Man Convicted of Double Murder as Juvenile is Freed After 21 Years in Prison,
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resentenced to seventy-five years or more.144

B. Michigan’s Implementation of Miller and
Montgomery
1. Resentencing Eligibility of Juveniles
The Michigan legislature passed a law solely to address
resentencing issues under Miller in their state criminal procedure
code.145 The law went into effect March 2014, and it sets out what
procedures must happen if the Michigan Supreme Court or the U.S.
Supreme Court finds that Miller is retroactive.146 The first
procedure is that within thirty days of the higher court’s final
decision—that Miller is retroactive—the prosecuting attorney must
give the chief circuit judge of each particular county in Michigan a
list of all the individuals who are both subject to that court’s
jurisdiction, and who must be resentenced.147 Then, within 180 days
of the higher court decision becoming final, that prosecuting
attorney must file motions for resentencing on all of the cases in
which the prosecuting attorney will be seeking a resentence of life
without parole.148 Michigan prosecutors have abided by this process
and filed these motions.149

CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 18, 2018), www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ctmet-juvenile-murderer-freed-20180118-story.html (reporting that Jamie
Hauad was resentenced to seventy years); Eldeib & Mills, supra note 142
(reporting that Steven Hawthorne was resentenced to sixty-eight years,
Jacqueline Montanez was resentenced to sixty-three years); Jeff Bonty, Life
Sentence Overturned for Convicted Kankakee Killer, KANKAKEE DAILY J. (July
31,
2015),
www.daily-journal.com/news/local/life-sentence-overturned-forconvicted-kankakee-killer/article_3d1fac0b-367f-5372-ac594042e5bd1418.html (reporting that Nicholas Tang was resentenced to seventy
years); Associated Press, U.S. High Court Ruling Could Affect 100 Illinois
Inmates, CHI. SUN-TIMES (Jan. 26, 2016), chicago.suntimes.com/crime/u-s-highcourt-ruling-could-affect-100-illinois-inmates/ (reporting that Gerald Rice was
resentenced to sixty years); Smith supra note 22 (reporting on Addolfo Davis’
decreased sentence).
144. Megan Crepeau, Gang Member Given 75 Years in Prison for Killing
Honor Student on CTA Bus in 2007, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 10, 2018),
www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-met-blair-holt-murdersentence-20180109-story. html (reporting that Michael Pace received a new
seventy-five-year sentence).
145. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 769.25 (2018).
146. Id. § 769.25a (4) (2018). These procedures are now in place as the
Supreme Court has found Miller to be retroactive. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at
732.
147. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 769.25a (4)(a) (2020).
148. Id. § 769.25a (4)(b) (2020).
149. Ryan Grimes, Prosecutors Ignoring Supreme Court Call to Give
Juvenile Lifers a New Sentence, Says ACLU, MICH. RADIO (Dec. 12, 2016),
www.michiganradio.org/post/prosecutors-ignoring-supreme-court-call-give-
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If a motion is not filed, the court will have resentencing
hearings for any other individual that was sentenced to life without
parole as a juvenile – and the new sentences given during these
hearings will be for a term of years between sixty and twenty-five
years.150 The statute then details the order of priority for these
resentencing hearings.151 First priority is given to individuals who
have been imprisoned for twenty years or more,152 second priority
is given to those cases where the prosecutor is requesting life
without parole as the resentence,153 and cases not falling into either
of these categories have last priority for a judge to hear.154 This
section of the code allows for individuals to be resentenced without
necessarily having to file petitions themselves in order to be
resentenced.155
2. Making a Finding of Incorrigibility
Before 2018, the Michigan Courts of Appeals were split on how
to apply the “incorrigibility” standard mentioned in the Supreme
Court’s opinions.156 The Michigan Supreme Court settled this state
appellate court split when it decided two cases together in People v.
Skinner.157 Skinner held that while Miller and Montgomery could
be read to impose a requirement that juveniles are found
incorrigible before they are resentenced to life without parole,158
those U.S. Supreme Court cases ultimately did not hold as such.159
Therefore, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that trial courts
are not required to make a finding160 that an individual is
incorrigible before sentencing them to life without parole.161 The
Court ruled that states can develop their own procedural rules to

juvenile-lifers-new-sentence-says-aclu (discussing that Michigan prosecutors
filed motions to re-sentence individuals to life without parole in approximately
sixty percent of eligible cases).
150. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 769.25a (4)(c) (2020).
151. Id. § 769.25a (5) (2020).
152. Id. § 769.25a (5)(a) (2020).
153. Id. § 769.25a (5)(b) (2020).
154. Id. § 769.25a (5)(c) (2020).
155. Id. § 769.52a (2020).
156. Compare People v. Skinner, 877 N.W.2d 482, 505 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015)
(holding the trial court must find a juvenile to be irreparably corrupt before
imposing a life without parole sentence), with People v. Hyatt, 891 N.W.2d 549,
576-77 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016) (holding that there should be a “heightened degree
of scrutiny” when imposing life without parole on a juvenile).
157. People v. Skinner, 917 N.W.2d 292 (Mich. 2018).
158. Id. at 307.
159. Id. at 307-08.
160. Id. This court found that “whether a juvenile is ‘irreparably corrupt’ is
not a factual finding” Id. at 310-11. It is a moral judgment made by the court.
Id. at n. 11.
161. Id. at 309.

2020]

Resentencing Juveniles

331

enforce Miller.162
3. Impact of Prison Behavior on Resentencing
As discussed above, Michigan passed a bill to address the many
different aspects of the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Miller.163
This law specifies which traits, characteristics, and behaviors of the
individual that shall and may be taken into account to determine
an appropriate resentence.164 Section(a)(6) of the statute details
that while the factors listed in Miller shall be considered, the court
may consider other factors, “including the individual’s record while
incarcerated.”165 The Michigan Supreme Court has pointed out that
since “may” is permissive, the language of this statute does not force
the trial court to inquire into facts beyond what is presented to them
and therefore courts are not required to consider the individual’s
record in prison if it is not presented to them.166
4. Definition of a De Facto Life Sentence
Michigan sentencing statutes allow for an individual to be
sentenced within a specific range of years (i.e. forty to sixty
years).167 Due to this, individuals who argue their sentences
constitute de facto life sentence must argue that the low end of their
sentencing range is a de facto life sentence.168 Courts in Michigan
have held sentences are not de facto life when the individual has
the possibility of release after thirty-five or forty years in prison,
even if their maximum sentence is a much higher term of years.169
5. Outcomes for Resentences in Michigan
When Miller was decided in 2012, Michigan had the second
highest number of juveniles serving life without parole sentences in
the United States.170 There were 363 individuals serving life
162. Id.
163. Hill v. Snyder, 821 F.3d 763, 768 (6th Cir. 2016).
164. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 769.25 (a)(6) (2020).
165. Id.
166. Skinner, 917 N.W.2d at n.9.
167. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 769.34 (2018).
168. People v. Bryant, No. 339925, 2018 Mich. App. LEXIS 3225, at *18
(Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 25, 2018).
169. See id. (finding a thirty-five-year minimum sentence constitutional, as
defendant could be released at age fifty-five, and “defendant has not shown that
there is no reasonable possibility of him living to [fifty-five] years old”); People
v. Howard, No. 337589, 2018 Mich. App. LEXIS 3018, at *6 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug.
14, 2018) (holding a forty- to sixty-year sentence constitutional, as the
defendant was only fifty-three and could be potentially released in 2018).
170. Emma Winowiecki & Kaye Lafond, Update: How Many of Michigan’s
“Juvenile Lifers” Have Been Re-Sentenced?, MICH. RADIO (Aug. 25, 2017),
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without parole sentences for crimes committed as juveniles.171 Some
have argued that Michigan’s laws which grant automatic transfer
to adult court in certain circumstances172 for certain crimes, and for
juveniles as young as fourteen, contributed to this high number of
juvenile life without parole sentences.173 As of August 2017, ninetyone of the original 363 individuals had been resentenced, twentyfour of those individuals to a term of years.174

C. Florida’s Implementation of Miller and
Montgomery
1. Resentencing Eligibility of Juveniles
In 2014, the Florida legislature passed a comprehensive law
regarding juvenile resentencing.175 Section 921.1402 governs the
eligibility of juveniles sentenced to life without parole to have their
sentences reviewed.176 This section allows juveniles sentenced to
over twenty-five years to have their sentences reviewed after
twenty-five years.177 Additionally, those juveniles sentenced to over
fifteen years can have their sentences reviewed after fifteen years,
and those sentenced to over twenty years can have their sentence
reviewed after twenty years.178 The statute also mandates that the
Florida Department of Corrections notify these juveniles eighteen
months before they are eligible to request a hearing to review their
sentence.179 After the juvenile is notified they must submit an
application to the court to ask for a hearing to review their
sentence.180 Under the law, the resentencing court shall hold a
hearing after they receive an application from a juvenile.181

www.michiganradio.org/post/update-how-many-michigans-juvenile-lifershave-been-re-sentenced.
171. Id.
172. MICHIGAN ACLU, SECOND CHANCES: JUVENILES SERVING LIFE
WITHOUT PAROLE IN MICHIGAN PRISONS 9-10 (2004), www.aclumich.org/
sites/default/files/field_documents/juv_lifers_v8.pdf.
173. Id. at 10 (discussing that these laws also “eliminated judicial
consideration of a juvenile’s mental capabilities or level of involvement in the
crime before transfer” to adult court).
174. Winowiecki & Lafond, supra note 170.
175. 2014 FLA. LAWS ch. 220.
176. FLA. STAT. § 921.1402 (2018).
177. Id. § 921.1402 (2)(b). The law also states that if those juveniles
sentenced to twenty years or more do not receive a resentence at their first
hearing, they are entitled to another hearing ten years later. Id. at § 921.1402
(2)(d).
178. Id. § 921.1402 (2)(c)-(d) (2020).
179. Id. § 921.1402 (3) (2020).
180. Id. § 921.1402 (4) (2020).
181. Id. § 921.1402 (6) (2020).
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2. Making a Finding of Incorrigibility
The Florida Supreme Court has not yet made a conclusion
regarding a finding of incorrigibility with the same precision as
courts in Illinois and Michigan.182 The Florida Supreme Court has
only held that each sentence given to a juvenile must be
individualized in order to separate juveniles who are irreparably
corrupt from those “whose crimes reflect ‘transient immaturity.’”183
While not explicitly mandating a finding of permanent
incorrigibility, the Court held that life without parole sentences
should be rare and only given when a crime reflects “irreparable
corruption.”184 Subsequent Florida cases have given weight to this
language and remanded cases in order to allow juveniles to show
that their crime did not reflect irreparable corruption.185 Other trial
courts have gone so far to find that while a juvenile’s behavior “could
be the definition of irreparable corruption” he was still entitled to a
resentencing hearing.186 This leaves the lower courts in Florida in
flux, with no clear directive on whether there is the need to make a
determination of permanent incorrigibility.
3. Impact of Prison Behavior on Resentence
The Florida statute governing juvenile resentencing directly
addresses the topic of behavior in prison as a factor to take into
account at a resentencing hearing.187 The statute describes that at
the resentencing hearing of a juvenile that received life without
parole, the factors mentioned in Miller must be analyzed, along with
other factors the Florida legislature has deemed important.188
Three of these additional factors to be analyzed include examining
the individual’s behavior while they have been imprisoned.189
182 Compare Holman, 91 N.E.3d at 863 (pronouncing there must be a
finding of incorrigibility before resentencing a juvenile to life without parole),
with Skinner, 917 N.W.2d at 309 (stating there does not have to be a finding of
incorrigibility before resentencing a juvenile to life without parole).
183. Landrum v. State, 192 So.3d 459, 466 (Fla. 2016) (quoting Montgomery,
136 S. Ct. at 734).
184. Landrum, 192 So.3d at 469 (permitting that “sentencing of a juvenile
offender to life imprisonment only in the most ‘uncommon’ and ‘rare’ case where
the juvenile offender's crime reflects ‘irreparable corruption.’”) (quoting Miller,
567 U.S. at 479-480).
185. Atwell v. State, 197 So. 3d 1040, 1050 (Fla. 2016).
186. Horsley v. State, 160 So. 3d 393, 395-97 (Fla. 2015) (finding a hearing
was still required when the juvenile participated in a robbery where a
convenience store owner was shot in the chest and killed, where the juvenile
was the one who shot the firearm).
187. FLA. STAT. § 921.1402 (2020).
188. Id. § 921.1402 (6)(a)-(i) (2020) (including the opinion of the victim or
their family).
189. Id. § 921.1402 (6) (2020) (stating that these factors are “(a) [w]hether
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Section Seven of the statute shows the importance Florida has put
on the rehabilitation of the imprisoned individual, as the section
states that the juvenile can be resentenced if the court finds that he
or she “has been rehabilitated and is reasonably believed to be fit to
reenter society.”190
4. Definition of a De Facto Life Sentence191
Florida has yet to set concrete rules on what specifically
constitutes a de facto life sentence.192 In 2015, the Florida Supreme
Court found that a ninety-year aggregate sentence, where the
earliest release could occur when the juvenile was ninety-five years
old, was a de facto life sentence.193 In other rulings, Florida courts
have found a fifty-seven-year sentence to be a de facto life
sentence194 but conversely found that a fifty-year sentence was not
a de facto life sentence.195 Florida courts encounter fewer questions
than other states pertaining to this issue since the legislature
passed Section 921.1402, which allows most juveniles sentenced to
long terms to have their sentences reviewed after a number of
years.196 In Atwell v. State, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that a
juvenile sentenced to life, but with parole eligibility after twentyfive years still needed to be resentenced.197 Due to the practical
application of Florida parole laws, he would not have the
opportunity to be released until 2130, therefore being forced to serve
a 140-year sentence.198 Yet in 2018, the Florida Supreme Court
the juvenile offender demonstrates maturity and rehabilitation[,]” “(b)
[w]hether the juvenile offender remains at the same level of risk to society as
he or she did at the time of the initial sentencing[,]” and “(g) [w]hether the
juvenile offender has successfully obtained a high school equivalency diploma
or completed another educational, technical, work, vocational, or selfrehabilitation program, if such a program is available”).
190. Id. § 921.1402 (7) (2020).
191. Adams v. State, 188 So. 3d 849, 851 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (defining
a de facto life sentence as “one that exceeds the defendant’s life expectancy”).
192. Peterson v. State, 193 So. 3d 1034, 1037 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)
(stating that “Florida Supreme Court has not specifically answered the question
of when a lengthy term-of-years sentence becomes a de facto life sentence”).
193. Henry v. State, 175 So. 3d 675, 680-81 (Fla. 2015).
194. Peterson, 193 So. 3d 1034 (holding that the constitutionality of a
juvenile’s sentence does not only depend on the juvenile’s life expectancy and
the age he or she will be when they are released).
195. Williams v. State, 197 So. 3d 569, 571-72 (Fla. App. 2016) (finding that
even if the defendant had to serve all fifty years of his sentence, he would be
released at age sixty-eight, therefore his sentence was not a de facto life
sentence).
196. Montgomery v. State, 230 So. 3d 1256, 1263 (Fla. App. 2017) (holding
a twenty-five-year minimum sentence was constitutional, as after twenty-five
years the juvenile’s sentence will be mandatorily reviewed).
197. Atwell, 197 So. 3d at 1041.
198. Id.
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overruled this finding, stating that juveniles who received life with
the possibility of parole after twenty-five years are not entitled to a
resentencing as they do have a meaningful opportunity for
release.199 These disparate rulings have left many juveniles in
Florida unclear on if they will be eligible for a resentence or not.200
5. Outcomes for Resentencing in Florida
Florida had approximately 600 juveniles serving sentences of
life without the possibility of parole when Miller was decided, the
highest number of any state.201 By 2017, eighty-five of those
juveniles who committed homicide offenses had been
resentenced.202 Additionally, eighty individuals serving life without
parole for non-homicide crimes had been resentenced since the 2010
Supreme Court ruling in Graham.203 Various factors have been
discussed for the slow pace of resentencing in Florida including lack
of funds, confusion surrounding which types of sentences must be
reviewed, and prosecutors adapting and understanding the new
laws.204 State public defenders have asked the state for additional
funds to support this re-sentencing process, but the state budget did
not include the additional requested funds in 2017.205

IV. PROPOSAL
As evidenced above, states have addressed resentencing
juveniles under Miller and Montgomery in a myriad of ways. These
different laws and rulings have impacted the efficiency and speed
of resentencing as well as the eligibility of individuals to be
resentenced and the level of fairness that accompanies these
sentences. In many cases, states have been left with unclear laws
that make the juveniles who could be eligible for resentencing under
Miller unclear of how or when they will be resentenced, and to what
type of new sentence.
Below are recommendations that every state should adopt to
address juvenile resentencing in order to implement Miller and
Montgomery in the most just and most efficient way, making judges,
199. State v. Michel, 257 So. 3d 3, 7 (Fla. 2018).
200. Sullivan, supra note 100.
201. State-By-State Look, supra note 30.
202. Gary Fineout, Resentencing Try Stalled for Most Florida Juvenile
Lifers,
TAMPA
BAY
TIMES
(July
31,
2017),
www.tampabay.com/incoming/resentencing-try-stalled-for-most-floridajuvenile-lifers/2332050 (according to Roseanne Eckert, the coordinating
attorney at the Florida Juvenile Resentencing and Review Project at Florida
International University).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. They had requested eight million dollars for implementation. Id.
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lawyers, and individuals imprisoned very clear on what is expected
of them to be resentenced, what type of evidence to present, and
what types of rulings can be made. The laws below are proposed so
that juveniles will be resentenced fairly and without years and
years of waiting to find out their fate.

A. Automatic Eligibility for Resentencing
Illinois, Michigan, and Florida have addressed eligibility in
different ways. From having each individual file a post-conviction
petition in Illinois,206 to an automatic review of sentences after a
term of years in Florida,207 to an automatic resentencing by a predetermined order of priority in Michigan.208 These states also have
varying levels of success in the number of juveniles that have been
resentenced, Michigan has resentenced twenty-five percent of their
juveniles since the rulings in Miller and Montgomery,209 Florida has
resentenced fourteen percent,210 and Illinois has resentenced thirtyfive percent.211
Although Illinois has the highest percentage of juveniles
resentenced, laws and precedent in Illinois present the least
petitioner-friendly eligibility rules. Even the Illinois courts have
said that “a defendant faces immense procedural default hurdles
when bringing a successive post-conviction petition”212 as under
Illinois law only one post-conviction petition can be brought without
leave of the court.213 An individual subject to an unconstitutional
sentence should not be subject to “immense”214 procedural hurdles
in order to be resentenced. Even the procedural laws in Florida,
while on their face are seemingly more efficient, they still allow
individuals mandatorily sentenced to life without parole to be
imprisoned for fifteen to twenty-five years without a review of their
sentence.215 This is not fair to the individuals serving these
sentences, as they do not deserve to be serving an unconstitutional
sentence.
States should adopt two different procedures regarding
eligibility – modeled after laws in Florida and Michigan – for
206. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122 (2020).
207. FLA. STAT. § 921.1402 (2020).
208. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 769.25a (2020).
209. Winowiecki & Lafond, supra note 170.
210. State-by-State Look, supra note 30 (reporting that Florida has
resentenced 85 of its juvenile lifers out of 600, therefore fourteen percent have
been resentenced).
211. Id. (describing how Illinois has resentenced thirty-five percent of its
juveniles serving life without parole).
212. Davis, 6 N.E.3d at 716.
213. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-1(f) (2020).
214. Davis, 6 N.E.3d at 716.
215. FLA. STAT. § 921.1402(2) (2020).
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efficiency in resentencing and fairness to the incarcerated
individuals. First, like in Florida, all individuals eligible for
resentences should be notified by the government itself.216 This will
allow individuals to be aware of the rights they have and be aware
that they can assert them. If individuals are unaware they are
serving an unconstitutional sentence, there is little chance they will
seek to change it. Without an official governmental notification,
individuals are left to their own research or word of mouth to learn
they can even be resentenced. A law requiring governmental
notification will allow individuals to assert their rights as they will
be informed of what they are.
Secondly, states should adopt laws based on Michigan’s
automatic resentencing hearing laws.217 Individuals should not
have to file a petition themselves like in Illinois,218 in order to have
their sentences addressed. Michigan law requires that these cases
are put back on the docket,219 and other states should adopt this
type of law as well. This will help eliminate the confusion that many
juvenile lifers have regarding their sentence after Miller, and it will
also jump-start the process for all of these individuals, making sure
they are resentenced as soon as possible, not when they individually
figure out they can be.
Michigan’s laws also give a sort of resentencing hierarchy,
stating which types of prisoners should be granted resentencing
hearings first, second, and third.220 Other states should adopt this
hierarchy as well, as it allows those who have been in prison the
longest and those who are facing life without parole again to have
their sentences reviewed first.221 This brings a level of justice and
efficiency to this system, as those suffering the longest or with the
highest possible resentences are able to have their sentences
addressed as soon as possible.222 This priority order for resentencing
allows a group that has suffered the most injustice to be at the front
of the line. This does not seek to diminish the suffering or injustice
of those serving life without parole who are not first in line for
resentencing, but procedurally there must be a priority system in

216. Id. § 921.1402(3) (2020).
217. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 769.25a (4)-(5) (2020) (mandating the
prosecuting attorney file motions regarding juvenile life without parole cases
and setting forth an order in which resentencing hearing will take place).
218. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122 (2020).
219. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 769.25(4) (2020).
220. Id. § 769.25a (5) (2020).
221. Id. § 769.25 (2020).
222. See, e.g., Samantha Melamed, Philly’s Oldest Juvenile Lifer
Resentenced, but Is It Too Late?, PHILA. INQUIRER (May 17, 2017),
www.philly.com/philly/news/crime/phillys-oldest-juvenile-lifer-resentencedbut-is-it-too-late-20170517.html (describing the resentencing of Joseph Ligon,
then eighty years old, who was sentenced to life without parole in 1953 for a
crime committed when he was fifteen).
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order for justice to be best served.

B. Mandated Finding of Incorrigibility in
Resentencing Hearing
Courts should be forced to find that an individual is
incorrigible before they are resentenced to life without parole.223 In
Michigan, there does not have to be a finding of incorrigibility to
resentence an individual to life without parole.224 In Michigan, out
of the ninety-one juveniles that have been resentenced, sixty-seven
of them, or seventy-three percent, have been resentenced to life
without parole.225 At almost three-fourths, this is an overwhelming
percentage of those resentenced. While many factors are taken into
account to determine the resentence, courts may find it easier to
hand down a resentence of life without parole if they are not
required to find that individual is incorrigible in order to do so.
It is difficult to prove that an individual is incorrigible and has
no prospects for rehabilitation or for reform. When the
incorrigibility of an individual doesn’t have to be addressed, it is far
easier both to argue and to find they should be resentenced to life
without parole. Life without parole for a crime committed as a
juvenile is not a light sentence—it is a death sentence. There must
be high bars of evidence and procedure that courts have to meet in
order to sentence a juvenile to life without parole. The Supreme
Court has cited studies on brain development and impulse control
of minors and found that they are less culpable than adults for the
same crimes.226 Juveniles are more likely to be rehabilitated,
making a life without parole sentence inefficient and cruel. A
sentence of life without parole for juveniles should not be given out
lightly and in order for any sentence of life without parole to be even
remotely just, there must be a mandated finding of incorrigibility.

C. Prison Behavior Must Be Taken into Account
In a resentencing hearing, courts should take into account the
individual’s behavior while they have been in prison and the
rehabilitation that has taken place there. In Illinois, courts have
ruled that prison behavior cannot be considered at all when
evaluating an individual for a resentence under Miller.227 This can
223. This position does have its detractors. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 744
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the impossibility of demanding state courts
find incorrigibility, as this would be “impossible in practice” and referring to it
as “silliness”).
224. Skinner, 917 N.W.2d at 309.
225. Winowiecki & Lafond, supra note 170.
226. Miller, 567 U.S. at 471-72.
227. Holman, 91 N.E.3d at 864.
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lead to those who have been rehabilitated still forced to spend years
of their life in prison. Adolofo Davis, who was resentenced to life in
prison, made great changes, reforms, and achievements while
imprisoned – all evidence brought up at his resentencing hearing.228
He was still resentenced to life in prison. While at the time of his
hearing in 2015, Illinois had no rule that prison conduct could not
be used to determine resentences.229 Outcomes similar to his are
bound to happen if judges are not allowed to see how an individual
has changed their life while imprisoned.
An important theory of punishment is rehabilitation230 and if
an individual has been rehabilitated by their time in prison, that
should be taken into account when determining their new sentence.
The language of Miller and Montgomery discuss that an individual
should only be sentenced to life without parole if he or she has no
chance for reform and is permanently incorrigible.231 If an
individual has shown a vast improvement in behavior, gotten their
GED, or held a prison job, this can show an individual is not
permanently incorrigible. When courts are limited to look at an
individual’s behavior as a juvenile, this doesn’t take into account
the reality of who they are.232 A problem with sentencing juveniles
is that courts do not know how they will mature and change as they
grow. Being able to look at an individual’s behavior in prison can
show if they are or are not incorrigible and how harsh their new
sentence should be. Therefore, courts must take this factor into
account when determining a resentence.

D. De Facto Life Sentence Must be Specifically
Defined
States must adopt legislation that details what numerical term
of years sentence is equal to a life sentence. This way, three
228. Eckholm, supra note 1 (reporting that while in prison, Adolofo earned
his GED, became a teacher’s aide, became a mentor for young men, and began
working closely with a Reverend in Chicago who counsels individuals who have
been both offenders and victims of crimes).
229. Holman, 91 N.E.3d at 864 (establishing this rule two years later, in
2017).
230. Craig S. Lerner, Life Without Parole as a Conflicted Punishment, 48
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1101, 1126, 1141 (2013) (arguing that while those
participating in the criminal justice system often frame a sentence of life
without parole as one with “the possibility of hope, self-improvement, and
rehabilitation” in reality, a sentence of life without parole completely “denies
the possibility of rehabilitation” as the individual will never again enter
society).
231. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734.
232. Brianna Boone, Treating Adults Like Children: Re-Sentencing Adult
Juvenile Lifers After Miller v. Alabama, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1159, 1180 (2015)
(arguing that reviewing only juvenile characteristics at a re-sentencing hearing
creates a paradox and inequitable results in sentencing).
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problems the courts encounter will be resolved. One, courts will
know when individuals with a term of years sentence must be
resentenced under Miller. Two, courts will know when the Miller
factors must be analyzed in terms of year sentences in the future.
Third, courts will know what new terms of years sentences can be
given out if an individual is found not to be incorrigible. When states
and courts have not set out an exact number of years that
constitutes a de facto life sentence, this brings about confusion and
uncertainty in many different situations, for judges, counsel, and
the juvenile lifers themselves.233 If there is no set term of year
number, individuals who bring petitions for resentencing have no
idea what the outcome will be. Judges will independently determine
what they believe a de facto life sentence is, and there will be
inconsistent outcomes across the states and across different
counties.
These types of problems would be solved if states and courts
set out an exact term of years that equals a de facto life sentence.
While some states have found that a ninety-year sentence is de facto
life234 and others that eighty-nine years is de facto life,235 the bar
should be much lower.236 Cases across the U.S. have cited237 the
United States Sentencing Commission Preliminary Quarterly Data
Report to show that the average life expectancy of a prisoner in the
general prison population is sixty-four years.238 This number may
even be too high for those sentenced as children, as it was calculated
using the “median age of federal prisoner at the time of
sentencing[,]” which was twenty-five years at the time.239 The
233. Graham, 560 U.S. at 124 (Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing that in oral
arguments counsel for the petitioner conceded that a forty-year sentence
without parole would “probably” be constitutional).
234. Henry, 175 So. 3d at 680-81.
235. Reyes, 63 N.E.3d at 888.
236. Bear Cloud v. State, 334 P.3d 132, 140-43 (Wy. 2014) (discussing that
in a series of cases in Wyoming, the Wyoming Supreme Court determined that
a forty-five-year sentence handed down to a juvenile who was sixteen years old
at the time of the crime was enough to trigger the protections of Miller and the
court on remand had to consider the factors of the individual’s youth and
immaturity when deciding his sentence).
237. Adele Cummings & Stacie Nelson Colling, There is No Meaningful
Opportunity in Meaningless Data: Why It Is Unconstitutional to Use Life
Expectancy Tables in Post-Graham Sentences, 18 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y
267, 269 (2014) (discussing that in some state cases, specifically in Colorado,
cited life expectancy tables created by CDC or specific life expectancy tables in
the Colorado Revised Statutes in order to determine if a juvenile’s sentence was
constitutional or not in regards to when they would be eligible for parole and
what their life expectancy according to these tables would be).
238. Buffer, 75 N.E.3d at 481; People v. Sanders, 56 N.E.3d 563, 571 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2016) (containing statistics and analysis through June 30, 2012).
239. Buffer, 137 N.E.3d at 778 (Burke, A., concurring) (citing Deborah
LaBelle, Michigan Life Expectancy Data for Youth Serving Natural Life
Sentences (2013), available at www.lb7.uscourts.gov/documents/17-12441.pdf).
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conditions in prison, including the level of violence, the
transmission of communicable diseases, poor diets, and low-quality
healthcare all contribute to a prisoner’s lessened life expectancy and
are exacerbated for those sentenced as children, as they spend a
higher percentage of life imprisoned.240 Due to this lessened life
expectancy, the term of years that states should adopt for de facto
life sentences should be a calculation.241 A term of years that equals
a life sentence should be calculated by subtracting the juvenile’s
age, at the time of the crime, from the average life expectancy of a
prisoner, which is sixty-four years. For example, if a seventeenyear-old is to be sentenced, a de facto life sentence for him or her
should be forty-seven years.242 There is a high probability that this
specific juvenile will only live to sixty-four years,243 and if a
seventeen-year-old is sentenced to any term of years higher than
forty-seven, there is a high probability that he will be spending his
entire life in prison. Therefore, states must adopt a specific
calculation based on the average life expectancy of prisoners to
specifically define de facto life sentences. This sixty-four-year
number is only a base starting point for this calculation. States
should use the most accurate statistics available about life
expectancies of those imprisoned as children, especially if statistics
are available pertaining to their specific state prison system.

V. CONCLUSION
States have sought to implement the holdings of Miller and
Montgomery in varied ways. While all of these different laws and
holdings fall in line with the constitutionality of the cases, they have
led to disparate outcomes for individuals in the states244 and to
240. Sanders, 56 N.E.3d at 571.
241. Buffer, 137 N.E.3d at 778 (Burke, A., concurring) (explaining that a
calculation should be used to determine what term of years constitutes a de
facto life sentence).
242. 64 years – 17 years = 47 years.
243. Cummings & Colling, supra note 237, at 270-71 (pointing out that some
argue that life expectancy tables and the like should not be used to determine
the constitutionality of life with parole sentences, as they can be interpreted
incorrectly, are an estimate for the general population, and tables do not take
into account other factors like socio-economic status). Yet using the estimated
life expectancy for federal prisoners would limit the problems posed by using
general life expectancy tables, even if they are delineated by race or gender.
Using a prisoner life expectancy as the base takes into account the conditions
of prison that would lessen an individual’s life that are not taken into account
in general tables.
244. Robert S. Chang, David A. Perez, Luke M. Rona, & Christopher M.
Schafbuch, Evading Miller, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 85, 105 (2015) (outlining
statistics that show beyond disparate outcomes for resentences, there is already
a disparity by race of juveniles that are sentenced to life without parole - 56.1
percent of juveniles sentenced to life without parole are black).
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confusion for judges, lawyers, and juvenile lifers, regarding who is
eligible and what their new sentences could be. States should be
aiming with their laws and holdings to achieve efficiency, justice,
and clarity in resentencing for these individuals. Accordingly, states
should adopt automatic resentencing based on an order of priority,
first those that have been held the longest, second those who could
receive life without parole sentences again, and lastly the rest of the
individuals sentenced to life without parole. States should mandate
that an individual must be found incorrigible before they are
resentenced to life without parole. States should adopt laws that
define de facto life, and it should be defined as sixty-four minus the
age the individual was when they committed the crime.
Additionally, courts should look at the prison record of the
individuals they are resentencing in order to give out the most just
sentences. These laws will create a system of implementing Miller
that is the most efficient and the most just and clear for juvenile
lifers.

